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POTENTIAL USES OF SMALLER SATELLITES 
FOR MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS
2Lt Dennis Montera and ILt Thomas Utsch 
Air Force Systems Command Space Division
Office of Deputy for 
Plans and Advanced Programs 
Los Angeles Air Force Base, California
ABSTRACT
This paper describes potentially attractive uses of smaller 
satellites for complementing current Air Force space systems. By 
mission area, the applications of smaller satellites as enhance- 
ments to current systems are shown for three operational scenari- 
os: (1) to provide dedicated support to tactical war-fighting 
users, (2) to provide a quick-response surge to augment current 
systems in a crisis, and (3) in the case of the failure or loss 
of a satellite, to provide responsive back-up systems for use 
until new primary systems can be deployed. Preliminary results 
show that in every space mission area, smaller satellites can 
potentially provide a useful enhancement to the current systems. 
The enhancements in most cases are improvements in coverage, 
capacity, and data timelines which are required from time to time 
by certain user segments. Enhancements in some cases simultane- 
ously improve the robustness and resiliency of the space mission 
area. The smaller satellites probably cannot realistically 
replace current systems, which have evolved to their current 
configuration through years of optimization of cost, mission 
capability, and survivability. The results show that using 
current technolgy and design practices, the 500-1000 pound weight 
class of satellite is what is being referred to as smaller, but 
useful.
INTRODUCTION
The potential use of smaller satellites for military operations 
has become a subject of great interest. Presented here are the 
results of work at Air Force Systems Command Space Division to 
understand what, if any, potential mission enhancements smaller 
satellites may provide. The term "smaller" refers to spacecraft 
which are less capable than many of the large steady-state sys- 
tems we have, but not microsatellites which could use very high 
technology to miniaturize subsystems.
A considerable amount of previous work has been done on the 
similar topics of responsive launch, reconstitutable space sys- 
tems, and survivable launch systems [1], [2], [3], [4]. The 
past studies primarily focused on communications, missile warn- 
ing, and weather missions.
Of the numerous potential applications of smaller satellites,
three operational scenarios are being investigated: (1) to 
provide dedicated support to tactical war-fighting users, (2) to 
provide a quick-response surge to augment the coverage, data
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quality, or data timelines of current systems in a crisis, and(3) in the case of the failure-or loss of a satellite, to provide 
responsive back-up systems for use until new primary systems can be deployed.
In the first scenario, smaller satellites are used on a steady- 
state basis to improve support to certain users, in certain 
areas, who are not getting what they-.need now but cannot afford 
to by their own copy of existing large systems. Often this comes 
from their low user priority rating. 'The smaller satellites do 
not necessarily need to be responsive.
The second scenario refers to the surge capability provided by 
responsive satellites to be quickly deployed to improve service 
to certain users in a crisis scenario, e.g. the Falklands con- 
flict, Grenada operation, Desert One operation, etc. The users' 
needs in peacetime are supported by current systems. As a crisis 
develops, their needs greatly increase, but the current systems 
cannot quickly adjust. The surge satellites can best be used in 
this mode by optimizing their performance for the user in need 
and his area of interest only. After the crisis subsides in a 
few months, the user no longer needs this additional support.
The third scenario refers to providing a minimum essential inter- 
im capability in the event of loss or attack on a large current 
system. Current systems usually take from 3 to 6 months to 
launch and check-out on orbit. To re-design them for rapid 
launch and check-out is not affordable, but a smaller system that 
can be made affordable could have great utility for this mode of 
operation. Following is a description, by mission area, of some 
potentially interesting uses for smaller satellites and some 
preliminary concepts.
Dedicated Steady-state Communications
The current communications architecture, comprised of the Defense 
Satellite Communication System (DSCS) , Fleet Satellite Commauni- 
cation System (FLTSATCOM), and soon HILSTAR systems, is very 
effective in supporting users' needs for inter-theater communica- 
tions, but lacks the capacity to also support all intra-theater 
communications needs of tactical warfighting users (theater 
commanders and their tactical forces) . Because war-fighters have 
a lower priority for communications usage than strategic, intel- 
ligence, and National Command Authority users, they perceive that 
they will not have essential communications service available for 
their use in time of crisis. Most users have already purchased 
terminals, but are unable to use them even in peacetime for 
combat exercises scheduled far in advance. For example, UHF 
terminals exceed the available bandwidth capacity by a factor of 
10. A review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-validated conmunica- 
tions requirements reveals that 60 percent of the unsatisfied, 
requirements are for intra-theater voice communication.
Smaller satellites may be able to be efficiently used, to supple- 
ment the current communications architecture and fill the intra- 
theater need. In order to make the communications affordable,
the satellites should offer a smaller, but useful, increment of
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communications capacity than our current systems. Sizing this 
useful increment of capability is difficult and requires a number 
of iterations between the user community and system designers. A 
preliminary estimate based on MILSTAR's planned capability in a 
very stressed environment shows that roughly 36 voice channels 
are a potentially useful capability.
Since continuous coverage is mandatory for the war-fighting users 
involved in a crisis, geostationary orbits seem to fit this con- 
cept best. This allows one satellite to cover an entire theater, 
thereby reducing complexity for the satellite controller. Other 
deployment strategies also offer full coverage, but more satel- 
lites are required. For example, three satellites in three 
planes are required for continous theater coverage using semi- 
synchronous elliptical high inclination orbits. The lowest cost 
constellation will be eventually decided by launch vehicle capa- 
bility and cost.
To reduce total cost to the user, a dedicated communications 
satellite should be compatible with the user's existing or 
planned terminals, i.e. if the user has an SHF terminal, the 
satellite should "look" like a DSCS.
To reinforce the theater commander's perception of ownership of 
the satellite, command and control will not be done in the con- 
ventional way. Spacecraft housekeeping (ephemeris uplinking, 
telemetry read-out) could be performed by AFSPACECOM, but the 
payload (e.g. antenna, spot beam location) controlled by the 
theater commander. The theater commander should have total au- 
thority to allocate his communications capacity as he sees fit.
Survivability (both against jamming and ASAT attack) is a key 
driver of cost and size of the current communications systems. 
Since dedicated satellites would not be relied upon for inter- 
theater communications, the system survivability could be tai- 
lored to meet the threat of tactical scenarios. Threats in 
tactical scenarios are usually much smaller than in strategic 
scanarios; hence if affordability is a major goal for theater 
user-dedicated satellites, it may make sense to tailor surviva- 
bility measures.
Finally, since tactical forces need to practice and become com- 
fortable with a resource in peacetime before they will rely on it 
in battle, a user-dedicated communications satellite must operate 
as a steady-state resource. This could help to alleviate peace- 
time needs also. The satellite should be equipped with appropri- 
ate redundant back-up systems to ensure it has long lifetime.
Keeping this baseline concept of what could constitute an afford- 
able and useful tactical-user-dedicated communications satellite 
in mind, concepts which operate at SHF and EHF frequencies were
developed. These concepts may not be optimized in performance or
size, but they are models for first-order feasability analysis. 
The payload concept at SHF is basically a down-sized DSCS III. A
satellite can be built around the two 40 watt transponders of a 
DSCS III and provide two-thirds the power of a DSCS III with only 
one-third the bandwidth. A schematic of this payload concept is
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shown in Figure 1. The payload is ideal for tactical applica- f 
tions since smaller tactical terminals require more satellite j 
power than the larger strategic and wideband communications ] 
terminals for which DSCS was designed. This smaller satellite 1 
could dedicate more power to each user terminal and provide 
better service to the tactical user. It is still capable of 
servicing the wideband users of the SHF spectrum such as the 
Ground Mobile Forces. Reducing a DSCS to this smaller version 
would still supply multiple increments of the communications 
capability determined to be potentially useful to theater com- 
manders (36 voice channels) .
A payload concept at EHF is the FLTSATCOM EHF Package (FEP) , 
which is a small secondary payload on some FLTSATCOM satellites. 
Figure 2 is a layout of the FEP package. The FEP could be the 
payload on a smaller satellite and meet the required useful 
increment of intra-theater communications capacity, while provid- 
ing the anti-jam performance of MILSTAR due to the exotic wave- 
form and EHF spectrum used. This concept would only support 
narrowband users.
Another concept at EHF is to remove the MILSTAR signal processing 
equipment from the satellite and instead place it in a mobile 
ground processing station. The satellite would be a dual relay 
package. A station would transmit its signal to the satellite 
which would then downlink the information to the processing 
station. There the information would be processed and uplinked 
back to the satellite which would relay the information to the 
intended receive station of the transmission. To the operator, 
he still thinks he is talking to a MILSTAR-like satellite.
Responsive Communications Surge
The smaller tactical user-dedicated communications satellite 
concept previously discussed was designed for theater users who 
require that the system supporting them is available during non- 
crisis periods for routine use and training. But needs for 
communication systems which can be deployed responsively to 
support particular users in particular areas of interest also 
exist. Special operations forces, conducting training and exer- 
cises somewhere in the continental United States, could be able 
to obtain communications satellite links on theater-dedicated 
satellites (just described) to support their training. Hence 
they would have the chance to become familiar with the coranraiiea- j 
tions system during training. Consequently, they would rely on 1 
the satellites during a real mission. Should these units quickly j 
deploy to support a developing crisis, they would need respon- ! 
sively deployed communications satellites, with links identical 
to the ones used for training, to support the units in the 
of interest. This holds true for any quick reaction 
scenario.
Weather Sensing
Several potential uses of smaller satellites to support the 
weather mission exist. Cloud imagery is by far the most impor- 
tant data received by both strategic and tactical Defense Meteor-
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ological Satellite System (DMSS) users. Cloud image data is the 
only information transmitted directly from the satellites to the 
tactical earth terminals (ship-board and Mark IVa). The termi- 
nals also can receive the cloud imagery downlink data from the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
polar orbiting weather satellites. Many tactical users carry 
small terminals which receive foreign weather satellite signals.
During unstressed periods, the DMSS refresh rate (of six hours) 
may be acceptable to tactical users, but during a crisis, the 
users involved need much more rapid weather updates. To provide 
this refresh rate on a continuous basis to all parts of the world 
with DMSP is not realistic or affordable; but for limited peri- 
ods of time (during conflicts), users in the area of conflict 
highly value timely cloud imagery. A small satellite, containing 
only the cloud imaging payload that can be responsively launched 
and flown in an orbit which optimizes coverage over the crisis 
area of interest could have utility.
One deployment concept would use two satellites, flown 180 de- 
grees out of phase, in 8 hour period orbits, in one orbit plane 
inclined at 90 degrees. This constellation provides continuous 
coverage to all of the northern hemisphere above 34 degrees 
latitude, if the orbit apogees are positioned over the northern 
pole. This coverage pattern is stable for about 30 days, after 
which time the oblateness of the earth causes the line of apsides 
to rotate, degrading coverage to the region. Two 1000 Ib satel- 
lites can be launched on a single Delta 6925 booster into this 
orbit.
Payload options for the cloud imaging satellite include the 
Optical Linescan System (OLS), which is the primary imagery 
sensor on DMSP, and the Advanced Very High Radiation Radiometer 
(AVHRR), which is the primary sensor on NOAA. The total weight 
of a spacecraft carrying the OLS is in the neighborhood of 700- 
1000 Ib, and in 350-600 Ib range for the AVHRR (spacecraft weight 
can be decreased if higher technology and minimal redundancy are 
used).
Another use of the same small cloud imaging satellite is as a 
responsive back-up capability for failed or attacked DMSP satel- 
lites which could be used until a new DMSP is deployed. The 
smaller satellite, in this case, would be deployed in the same 
sun-synchronous orbit as the failed DMSP, with the same ascending 
node phasing.
Oceanographic Sensing
The AVHRR also provides three infrared spectral bands which users 
of the OLS do not receive. Taken together, the IR bands allow 
one to see the sea surface temperature profiles off of the Atlan- 
tic and Pacific coasts. The 3.8 micron band of the AVHRR allows 
detection of all surface ships because the exhaust steam parti- 
cles interact with the atmosphere at this wavelength and can be 
seen as streaks behind ships [5]. Tactical users sometimes rely 
on AVHRR imagery, but NOAA satellites have an un-encrypted down- 
link,'so the Soviets use the information too. In time of crisis,
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NOAA may have to be turned off to deny this information to the 
Soviets; hence a responsive smaller satellite carrying the AVHRR 
with an encrypted downlink may be needed to replace this capabil- 
ity in such a scenario.
Space Environmental Monitoring
Ionospheric warning and space environmental monitoring is another 
mission area where small satellites potentially can improve user 
support from space. Many HF,VHF , and low-frequency UHF terres- 
trial communicators increase their communication range by bounc- 
ing signals off of the ionosphere. A need exists to be able to 
accurately predict ionospheric disturbances which arise from 
solar flares and disrupt communications. A smaller satellite 
carrying a space environmental monitoring instrumentation payload 
flown in a circular polar orbit can provide greatly improved 
space environmental data. The optimal altitude for in-situ meas- 
urements is 300 km (DMSS altitude is 833 km) . The payload could 
be similar to the 200 Ib payload on the NOAA satellite could be 
flown on a small satellite weighing less than 1000 Ib.
Tactical Targeting
Tactical users need to get more timely information of the regions 
far beyond their battle line, or so-called FLOT (Forward Line of 
Troops). Responsive launch of smaller satellites into orbits 
which focus coverage on a crisis area of interest could have 
potential for supporting this need.
To achieve high resolution imagery, satellites need to be flown 
in very low orbits (300 km and below) . An infrared sensor which 
provided 1 meter resolution during the day and in clear weather 
would reguire a 2000 Ib total weight spacecraft. Resolution 
directly affects weight because it mandates the size of sensor 
optics. Relaxing the resolution by a factor of 2 to 2 meters, 
would result in an approximately 1200 Ib spacecraft. Another 
option is a synthetic aperture radar payload.
Infrared Backgrounds and Mapping Surveillance
The capability to provide a timely infrared map of a given area 
of interest, showing how the infrared background radiation com- 
pares to target infrared radiation levels, is needed to support 
IR guided munitions (heat seeking) deployment. A satellite with 
an infrared mapping payload which could be responsively launched 
to support a given area of interest could be useful. Depending 
on the resolution required, a down-sized version of the Landsat 
sensor payload (weight of 500 Ib, 10 meter resolution in 7 IR 
spectral bands) could be flown on a satellite with total weight 
well under 1000 Ib. Good coverage requires that a high- 
inclination, relatively low altitude circular orbit be used.
Wide Area Surveillance
Smaller infrared sensing satellites show potential for augmenting 
a space-based radar wide area surveillance and tracking system 
either to provide a steady-state support or support for short-
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duration crises. Being a passive surveillance system, infrared 
can be used to provide steady-state surveillance while not alert- 
ing the adversary and can cue the pulsing of the active radar 
system to provide the very exact target information needed just 
prior to strike. Radar consumes large amounts of power, allowing 
continuous operation for only a few hours at a time. Continuous 
radar surveillance also gives away the location of the radar 
emitter, increasing the threat of ASAT attack. A major limita- 
tion of infrared is its inability to penetrate clouds, but infra- 
red phenomenology can complement radar signature phenomenology to 
allow more precise detection and identification of objects.^ 
Deployment of the infrared satellites would have to be in high- 
inclination circular orbits near the radar platforms. Depending 
on the resolution required (10 meter resolution should be suffi- 
cient to identify large bombers and ships), the smaller infrared 
satellite could, be kept under 1000 Ib total weight.
A smaller satellite could be used either as a space-based bl- 
static radar emmitter which flies over an area of interest,
illuminating the region so receivers on the ground can detect 
objects in the sky or it can be used as a receiver to a large 
space-based radar illuminator by flying over the region of inter- 
est at much lower altitude than'the emitter, reducing the emitter 
power required, since the reflected signal does not travel as 
far.
ga.feellite_Control Network Augmentation
A small communications relay satellite could be' used to replace 
lost connectivity in a Satellite Control Network which results
from, loss of an overseas remote tracking station (RTS). By   
deploying the smaller satellite in. a low altitude orbit, a simple 
SGLS-to-SGLS relay payloads could store telemetry data downlinked 
from a stranded, satellite and then, downlink the stranded satel- 
lite. f s telemetry data to another RTS. Commands from the ground 
could be uplinked in the. way. The weight of such a satel- 
lite would be on the order of 500-800 Ib. Alternatively,: a more, 
complex heavier SGLS-to-DSCS transponder could be used on the 
 small relay satellite and transmit the stranded satellite/'s 
telemetry and uplinked command data in real time.
Navigation
A smaller satellite carrying a navigation (GPS) payload could be
to augment the coverage, and. availability of navigation 
satellites over an. area of interest in the. event that part of the
constellation destroyed by ASAT attack. is a very 
robust, gracefully degrading constellation which, has on-orbit 
sparing* Useful navigation capability is achieved, with as few as 
half of constellation operating. But over a period of time, 
it is. to down constellation using a co-orbital
ASAT, In this event, smaller navigation, satellites could 
be flown in high, inclination elliptical orbits improve navi- 
gation of interest*
Space Surveillance   ... . , . .
Smaller ''responsive satellites carrying visible-light sensor 
payloads (total satellite weight of 1000 pounds} could be used to 
augment our currently ground-based space surveillance system, 
improving -satellite attack warning for valuable geosynchronous 
satellites. Depending on the warning 'time required, one. or two 
visible light payloads flown in elliptical, 16 hour period, 
equatorial orbits are sufficient. They do not have to be de- 
ployed as a continuous augmentation of the space- surveillance 
system but can be deployed prior to escalation of a potential 
world or theater conflict. They could also be used to increase ... 
our space surveillance coverage in the southern hemisphere to 
detect deployment of payloads from the Soviet space shuttle.
High resolution imagery of spacecraft could be acquired using a 
1000 pound satellite deployed in an orbit which intersects the 
orbits of unknown satellites. Resolution of 4 inches at 40. km, 
which is sufficient resolution to discern the general function of 
an unkown satellite can be obtained in this satellite weight 
range.
CONCLUSION
Smaller satellites have potential uses in almost every space 
mission area as a means for complementing current systems to 
provide dedicated continuous support to theater tactical users, 
to provide quick response capabilities which support users in a 
crisis, and to provide a responsive interim back-up capability 
for lost systems.
The 1000 Ib class of satellites, using conventional technology 
and design practices for redundancy, seems to be the general 
limit on size of smaller satellites which still perform useful 
military missions.
Future work at the Plans and Advanced Programs Office of Air 
Force Systems Command Space Division will focus on refining and 
understanding the needs and uses of smaller satellites and de- 
veloping conceptual designs of smaller satellite systems which 
are compatible with current user terminals and practices.
It is hoped that mission application studies such as this will be 
considered when goals for smaller satellite technology develop- 
ment programs, such as the DARPA ASTP, are established.
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